Subscriber Commentary & Review Thread (#13)
Power v. Twitter, Surplus Tech Elite, Down and Out at Davos, China's Very Bad Year, Even More Gnostics, Why the Right Can't Beat ESG
Hello everyone, it’s great to be back with you in the New Year! I am as full of cheer and optimism as ever in 2023, including in a contribution to the latest issue of the fine Australian journal Quadrant:
So check that out if you’re down under or just want to peruse a great collection of antipodean political and cultural delights. Also a heads up that UnHerd published a short version of my last essay on the military-industrial complex, here. They had to drop some of the layers of the argument to compress it, but if you want to share that one with somebody who for some reason still refuses to subscribe to The Upheaval, you could send them this version.
Meanwhile, I know at least a few of you are indeed trapped in Oz because Substack has just released snapshots of basic geographical user data for writers, and I think it’s pretty cool:
So greetings and gratitude to all of you around the world, with special greetings to my one subscriber in Cameroon! Something seems to be wrong with the internet in Latvia, however.
With that housekeeping out of the way, we can turn to the main attraction: snarky commentary and review of interesting stuff on the internet.
(1) Re: The Twitter Files
The big story to happen since the last review thread is of course the (still ongoing) release of the “#TwitterFiles” by Elon Musk and journalists including Matt Taibbi, Bari Weiss, Michael Shellenberger, and others. I’m just going to assume that most of my readers will have already read them, as there’s simply too much material from their damning investigative reporting for me to cover here. Unless of course you’re one of those people that thinks it’s all a “nothingburger,” in which case I have no idea why you are reading this, except to collect dirt for my future show trial (please also like, share, and subscribe!)
Anyway, as Taibbi has noted, the big takeaway from the Twitter Files is not that the social media company was blatantly engaging in political censorship, or that its “Trust and Safety” employees were all ideological extremists, or that they actively gaslighted the public constantly about what they were doing – we already knew all that. The big story is the definitive confirmation that this censorship was fundamentally driven by the government and its bureaucracies, which were in constant close communication with the tech companies to tell them all the things they wanted to disappear. Over and over again, internal documents show that even the most zealous commissars at Twitter hesitated to fulfill escalating demands for censorship, only to be relentlessly pressured into complying by elected officials and the unelected organs of the security state. At least hundreds and potentially thousands of government employees were and are engaged in directing the censorship of citizens by private firms as their fulltime job.
In light of this, I thought it worth revisiting a piece from two years ago that came to mind as having aged relatively well.
Curtis Yarvin, “Big tech has no power at all” (Gray Mirror)
Yarvin argued back in 2021 that while the big tech companies were viewed by many on the right as powerful villains – perhaps the villains – in their own right, making censorship decisions for the purposes of manipulating politics, this was a basic misreading of what was happening:
To the fully enlightened observer, the [post-January 6 censorship wave of 2021] proves just the opposite: the tech “oligarchs” have no power at all. Mostly, if they could blink T-O-R-T-U-R-E at you in Morse code, they would. You don’t believe me but I’ll show you why you’re wrong.
…
[A social media executive] is in exactly the same position as his own moderators. He exercises power, but it is not his power, because it is not his will. The power does not flow from him; it flows through him. This is why we can say honestly and seriously that he has no power. It is not his, but someone else’s.
Moreover, as soon as the social media companies demonstrated they could be bullied, and therefore divert power to others, they immediately drew swarms of more bullies, since:
Facebook’s power leak produces a kind of oasis of power—water in the desert. The water causes the palm trees; the palm trees don’t cause the water.
Facebook was not designed to be a device for managing the minds of billions of people. But as that ape-man in 2001 taught us—if anything is a weapon, some ass-bandit will eventually figure out how to use it as a weapon… Facebook is indeed surrounded by enemies, but they are enemies of its own creation. Its business model creates a gigantic stash of power with no real way to defend it.
However, in retrospect I think the essay demonstrates one major flaw: Yarvin pointed to the virtual swarm of the press as being the ones who came after that power and pressured tech companies into decisions they wouldn’t otherwise take:
Zuck doesn’t want to do any of this. Nor do his users particularly want it. Rather, he is doing it because he is under pressure from the press. Duh.
I certainly wouldn’t deny the role that fear of bad press must have played in shaping big tech’s decisions. But at no point does Yarvin point his finger directly at the state. And we now know that it was fundamentally state power that these companies ultimately feared and obeyed, not that of the press; in this case the press was merely a supplementary tool used to communicate the threats of the regime. Yarvin once elsewhere quipped that, “In China they have state-run media; here we have a media-run state.” That line makes a clever point about ideological group think in Washington, but in this case it seems like it may need to be revised. Read the whole thing and decide for yourself.
Bonus reading: Reason’s “Facebook Files”, demonstrating how Facebook (like every tech company) was similarly pressured to fuse itself with the state; Glenn Greenwald on how the trend toward state censorship in the United States is only accelerating, as well as how Brazil is now copying the U.S. model to launch its own sweeping state censorship campaign against political opposition.
All this should also give conservatives and classical liberals serious pause if they imagine anything on the censorship front is going to actually change for the better now that Musk in charge of Twitter. While Twitter’s previous leadership and staff were much more ideologically aligned with the state, Musk will face exactly the same coercive pressures and incentives to comply that his predecessors did. In fact the state seems likely to simply double-down on the coercion, this time more directly and openly. Musk has signaled this possibility himself:

Inez Feltscher Stepman, “Tech's highly paid versions of Homer Simpson won't be missed” (Washington Examiner)
That doesn’t necessarily mean Musk’s takeover won’t have a big political impact in other ways, however. Inez Stepman, for one, argues that “the debate over censorship is arguably of secondary importance to the long-term impact of the Musk experiment,” because:
Musk's willingness to clean house — by some accounts, he has fired over two-thirds of Twitter’s former staff — could have a domino effect throughout Silicon Valley, putting a dagger in the heart of the Left’s ideological control over America’s powerful tech sector.
That’s because the simple functioning of the app itself hasn’t deteriorated. The arguments have mostly been over who gets to tweet, taking for granted it represents the only barrier to use. This raises an extremely dangerous question many would like very much to avoid: Exactly what, other than answering the emails of FBI agents and enforcing woke diktats, did two out of three Twitter employees, with an estimated median salary of $150,000 a year, do?
Musk’s tenure and his decisions as CEO pose a direct challenge to an entire class of well-paid managerial types, whose six-figure (sometimes seven-figure) jobs increasingly look like fat to cut as the tech sector moves toward leaner times.
The Achilles heel of our ruling class may not be its lack of wisdom or erudition or even its dedication to embracing the religion of wokeism but that many of them are, at the end of the day, highly paid versions of Homer Simpson.
Malcom Kyeyune makes a similar argument in “The Email Caste’s Last Stand” (though I think that title is rather over-dramatic).
(2) Down and Out at Davos
Speaking of ruling classes, let’s check in on how things have been going at the annual WEF meeting in Davos:


Ah, right, the usual. But then, really, nothing says more about the state of the world today than hearing a high-profile panel introduced with the words “I’m Brian Stelter, formerly of CNN, now a fellow at Harvard University…”
But it doesn’t sound like the global elites are actually having that much fun this year, to be honest. The WEF’s “Global Risks Report 2023” makes for interesting reading, in that it predicts a “Turbulent Twenties” ahead, a veritable “decade of disruption, decay and impossible choices.”
It’s filled with warnings about things like continued inflation, “Geoeconomic confrontation, erosion of social cohesion and societal polarization, widespread cybercrime and cyber insecurity and large-scale involuntary migration,” plus “historically high levels of public and private debt, the ever more rapid pace of technological development and the growing pressure of current climate change impact as well as the dire future outlook,” and so on.
Of particular note, it worries that, “Without a return to growth, jobs, and human development at a national level,” countries will “face the risk of ever-growing polarization and political stalemates.”
“Together, these [risks] are converging to create a unique, uncertain and turbulent 2020s… And with global risks inherently interconnected, the frequency and severity of ‘polycrises’ – where cascading impacts compound risks, often in unpredictable ways – is likely to increase over the next decade.”
Sound like tough times if you’re trying to manage the world. And if you’ve read my essay on technocratic nihilism, you’ll know why a more anxious Conditioner class can respond to that anxiety only by trying to grasp ever more tightly, seeking greater and greater control in the face of uncertainty and friction.
Related: “France plots surveillance power grab for Paris 2024 Olympics” (Politico EU); “Matthew B. Crawford: the perpetual state of emergency” (UnHerd)
(3) China’s Terrible, No Good, Very Bad Year
In a sudden U-turn, China finally ended its disastrous “zero-Covid” policy following public protests last November. The reason for this decision was probably less because the public so clearly wanted it than because restoring economic growth has become an absolute strategic imperative for China following the onset of Cold War 2. And China had managed to dig itself into a very deep hole here. Unfortunately for the CCP, China’s problems run much deeper than just the terrible decisions made during the pandemic.
“China’s Shrinking Population Is Deeper Problem Than Slow Growth for Its Economy” (WSJ)
This month China’s fourth quarter and full-year economic data for 2022 arrived at the same moment as new population data. Both were very bad to put it mildly (and, being official Chinese data, likely quite inflated). They paint a very grim picture of the situation the county faces moving forward. I haven’t found a really good holistic analysis on the many elements of this, so we’ll just go with this piece by the Wall Street Journal:
On Tuesday, the same day that China posted 3% growth, the second-worst growth rate since 1976, it also said that for the first time since 1961, its population shrank.
China’s population dropped by 850,000 to 1.412 billion. The shift toward a shrinking population, which came faster than Beijing had projected, marks a watershed moment in China’s history with profound implications for its economy and its status as the world’s factory floor.
The demographic milestone comes when, despite its enormous size, China’s economy is still that of a middle-income, developing country, as measured by average worker incomes when compared with the U.S. and other rich-country peers. China’s leaders have long held the ambition of leapfrogging the U.S. to become the world’s biggest economy, a task made harder by this strengthening demographic headwind, economists say.
…
Any rebound in consumption will also likely be constrained by a weak labor market and a housing downturn that has eroded the wealth of Chinese families. The jobless rate among people age 16 to 24 remained elevated at 16.7% in December, versus the peak of near 20% last summer. Growth in disposable income per capita could slow to around 4% each year in the next five years, downshifting from around 8% before the pandemic, according to David Wang, chief China economist at Credit Suisse.
A smaller workforce will likely restrain economic growth. An economy can only grow by adding workers or producing more with the workers it has. China’s working-age population, which peaked around 2014, is expected to fall by 0.2% a year until 2030, according to S&P Global Ratings.
Productivity growth has been slowing. It slid to 1.3% on average in the 10 years through 2019, from 2.7% in the preceding decade, according to estimates from the Conference Board, a nonprofit research organization.
“It seems like it’s going to get old before it gets rich,” said Andrew Harris, deputy chief economist at Fathom Consulting in London.
Whether China can succeed in turning things around on these fronts over the next decade will probably be the deciding factor in the whole direction of geopolitics and what the world looks like by mid-century (along with what happens inside the West as well, of course). All the “strategic” maneuvering and game-playing by both sides on the global stage is only of a distantly secondary importance.
The reason I have not yet written the third part of what was supposed to be a three-part China series in 2021, by the way, is because the overall picture of China’s trajectory (itself and vis-à-vis the West) has changed so rapidly over the last two years that I’ve not yet been able to settle on where I think the country is headed now. That will be a 2023 goal.
Related: In a surprise turn, the Netherlands broke ranks last week and refused to impose new U.S. restrictions on semiconductor exports to China that Washington has been pressuring its allies into complying with. This overlooked story is potentially a big deal, as it indicates the lure of the China market may nonetheless still be enough to fracture the Western bloc. But there are also some new reports that the Dutch will soon cave. We will see.
Bonus China Stuff:
Razib Khan has published a really fascinating history of the extraordinarily deep genetic history of Chinese civilization:
The Stanford Center on China’s Economy and Institutions has here summarized an interesting paper on the operation of China’s corporate social credit system (CSCS):
The researchers found no correlation between higher overall scores and better-governed firms or more profitable firms. Highly-leveraged firms, which are subject to higher default risks, were associated with lower total scores. They found that politically-connected firms were associated with higher CSCS scores, not as a result of better compliance or superior administrative track records, but by accumulating soft merits from party-state organs under the Social Responsibility category… as a system of evaluation structured by rewards and punishments, the research suggests that the CSCS has powerful behavioral modification potential, nudging businesses to adopt the industrial and social policies favored by the CCP, possibly even if they hurt the company’s bottom line.
Surely nothing like that could or would ever be implemented outside China…
(4) The ESG Hydra
Julius Krein, “Why the Right Can’t Beat ESG” (Compact)
This is a very in-depth and interesting dive into the Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) investment system, including the history of how it came about, how its rise has been enabled by certain key regulatory decisions (many of them by ostensibly pro-market champions), and how it has proven very resilient in the face of recent political attacks by the right. The core argument Krein advances over the course of the essay is that the “profits over politics” critique wielded like a mantra by right-liberals (aka conservatives) in fact only strengthens ESG, because ESG is in reality often quite profitable for many of those taking part in the scheme, and because “ESG, by its own terms, already interprets politics through the lens of profits and the attendant risks to shareholders.”
Libertarians will quibble. But I think it’s worth reading in full in any case if this issue is something that interests you at all.
(5) Why the Right Can’t Beat Big Trans
Nate Hochman, “How Gender Ideology Conquered South Dakota” (National Review)
Like the ESG piece, this excellent investigative report by Nate Hochman explores the American right’s core weaknesses through the lens of the deeply conservative state of South Dakota, where far-left ideas on gender identity have made extremely rapid legislative and institutional advances despite overwhelming popular opposition. How has this happened? What Hochman’s detailed reporting reveals is that the local healthcare conglomerate Sanford Health – “the largest rural health system in the United States” – along with out-of-state interests have unleashed a tidal wave of lobbying money to prevent any opposition from spoiling their ability to make huge profits off of selling puberty blockers and “gender-reassignment” surgery to minors. It turns out that money talks, with allegedly conservative politicians like Governor Kristi Noem repeatedly acting to protect Sanford’s interests. But this is not simply a straightforward issue of corruption; the fact is that “pro-growth” Republicans like Noem simply tend to inherently prioritize economic benefits over social values.
The piece should be read as a study of how extra-democratic power and influence functions. It could also be read as a counter-point to my essay on the relative influence of ideas/stories vs. money in “The Military-Industrial Complex Doesn’t Run Washington,” although I would point out that there are powerful psychological “stories” at play here too.
(6) Is Scientific Discovery Slowing Down?
Rob Lownie, “Study finds science is becoming less innovative” (UnHerd)
Some new supporting evidence for the Progress Skeptics:
A new paper published this week provides evidence that the progress of science has considerably slowed over the course of the last few decades. The research — authored by American academics Michael Park, Erin Leahy and Russell J. Funk — builds on a previous study, ‘Are ideas getting harder to find?’, which claims that “research effort is rising substantially while research productivity is declining sharply”.
Or is it? The authors appear to have created their own index of measurement – usually a gigantic red flag for bullshit. I found that Anjana Ahuja has more details at the Financial Times:
Russell Funk, associate professor in strategic management and entrepreneurship at Minnesota university, teamed up with PhD student Michael Park and Erin Leahey, a sociology professor at Arizona university, to analyse 45mn scientific papers and 3.9mn patents. They gave each paper and patent a “consolidation-disruption index” based on whether it built on previous findings or sent a field in a new direction.
Their intuition, the researchers wrote in scientific journal Nature this month, was that “if a paper or patent is disruptive, the subsequent work that cites it is less likely to also cite its predecessors”. For example, the first paper to announce that the Earth goes round the Sun would be referenced frequently by future scholars — but not the many earlier ones that (incorrectly) assert the opposite. The CD index ranged from -1 for a consolidating paper, to 1 for a disruptive paper.
I’m skeptical (even though I’m sympathetic to the broader thesis): citations are themselves an abstraction from real-world influence, and constantly gamed. Leave a comment if you’re an academic more familiar with such things than myself. I’d be interested to hear your thoughts.
(7) Know Your Gnostics
Speaking of progress skeptics, the great Mary Harrington (author of the forthcoming Feminism Against Progress) has published a piercing, and touchingly personal, essay on modernity’s dive into digital Neo-Gnosticism (as I’ve also written about in “The Reality War”):
Mary Harrington, “Surviving the Metaverse” (First Things)
By the time my household got its first dial-up connection, around 1997, I was already old enough to vote. But I instantly grasped the internet’s most bewitching promise. It wasn’t, as its progenitors imagined, merely a way of storing or sharing information. It held out the possibility of inching still closer to escape from the everyday world by radically expanding the class of things I could do without having to leave the world of ideas for embodied life.
…
In 2016, Robert P. George wrote an influential essay in First Things exploring the neo-Gnostic tendency within the liberal worldview, noting the prevalence of an intense mind/body dualism throughout, for example, contemporary sexual ethics. And the modern age has indeed been accompanied by a spreading desire to be anywhere other than in “the real world” as imagined by modernity—that is, to dream of higher or better worlds than the gross, corrupted material one.
…
But there is a critical difference between the Gnosticism of old and its return today in these tech-enabled parallel dimensions. For the ancient Gnostics, the problem with the world of flesh was how poorly it compared with the true, original world of spirit. Gnosticism took for granted that this world of spirit existed, and that it was in a sense truer and more objective than that of matter. Neo-Gnostics, though, evince no such underlying belief in a transcendent spiritual dimension.
The Metaverse affords no higher Platonic world of objectively existing Forms. On the contrary, it suggests that we can escape from our prison of flesh into an infinitude of infinitely customizable worlds of Forms, tailored to suit each individual. If the root of the Gnostic heresy is a longing for transcendent spiritual experience unburdened by the taint of embodiment, the Metaverse takes this longing a step further. Here, the relief proffered to those longing for bodiless transcendence takes the form of an individualism so radical it affords no space at all for shared meaning, save on an opt-in basis. And it does so with the aim of making money.
You should read the rest.
(8) DEI: International Declaration Edition
Speaking of separate realities, I can’t let the latest fruits of America’s new and improved diplomatic priorities go unnoted.
“Declaration of North America (DNA)” (The White House – January 10, 2023)
Today, President Andrés Manuel López Obrador, President Joseph R. Biden, and Prime Minister Justin Trudeau met in Mexico City for the 10th North American Leaders’ Summit (NALS). The leaders are determined to fortify our region’s security, prosperity, sustainability and inclusiveness through commitments across six pillars: 1) diversity, equity, and inclusion; 2) climate change and the environment; 3) competitiveness; 4) migration and development; 5) health; and 6) regional security.
Yes, evangelizing the ideology of DEI is now officially the top priority for all of North America. It’s right there in our DNA. An historic moment!
Diversity, equity, and inclusion is foundational to the strength, vibrancy, and resilience of our countries… President López Obrador, President Biden, and Prime Minister Trudeau reiterated their joint commitment to protect civil rights, promote racial justice, expand protections for LGBTQI+ individuals and deliver more equitable outcomes to all.
What, you thought things like the migration crisis would be more important? Well, just so you know, they have handled that too:
The three countries of North America each made ambitious commitments under the Los Angeles Declaration, including working together to advance labor mobility in North America, particularly regarding regular pathways, and have been delivering on these commitments.
Because nothing says “border security” like “labor mobility.”
Ok, that’s enough for now. Let me know what you’ve been reading and thinking about in the comments. Otherwise I’ll see you next month.
In my STEM field, citations have exploded because (1) modern word-processing software makes it much easier than it used to be to add citations ad infinitum, and (2) if you don't cite somebody (who really shouldn't be cited), they will email you to complain, and so it's just must easier to cite them up front. And those emails are in turn driven by academia bean-counters who look at citations as a mertic of qaulity for advancements and promotions. I expect that this phenomenon is occuring across all of science.
I think - in defence of Yarvins take on why big tech has no power - he wasnt explicitly saying that the media controls big tech, more that the values of the media (and by extension "the cathedral") are in lock step with the establishment in Washington, and his inference being that the media sets the agenda in that regard.
Washington effectively looks to the NYT for guidance on issues and then takes action. I dont believe he is stating it quite that sequentially, but the idea is that the media-academic axis effectively comes up with whats important and whats not, and the correct-thinking nodes of the permanent government absorb this and move accordingly.