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I did actually finish the entire essay, and I like it enough to get the book you recommended from my library. While I don't disagree with her "don't be cruel" theory, I also do not believe she's demonstrated that either the definition of cruelty or the injunction not to engage in it isn't grounded in the divine. God sneaks into her arg…
I did actually finish the entire essay, and I like it enough to get the book you recommended from my library. While I don't disagree with her "don't be cruel" theory, I also do not believe she's demonstrated that either the definition of cruelty or the injunction not to engage in it isn't grounded in the divine. God sneaks into her argument in several noticeable places. However, she's interesting, and for me to find a new political theorist interesting is rare. I'll likely have my civics students read this essay; whether I agree with it or not, it's a perspective that is worthy of their consideration. Thanks a lot for the recommendation.
This side of heaven, we will never find a society that agrees on ultimate ends without coercion. The combination of free will and sinfulness pretty much guarantees that. Utopia is a mirage, and always will be. (Well, unless we drug ourselves into compliance -- https://unherd.com/thepost/love-drugs-are-more-dangerous-than-you-think/ Of course, that would be coercive too.)
I think I'm in a middle ground between yourself and Shklar. At one place in Ordinary Vices, she is notably sceptical about whether religion is even compatible with with making cruelty the primary vices to be avoided (it is possible that she later revised this opinion). I think that definitely goes too far. In fact, I think it is a place where she falls into the nasty secular habit of engaging with a lazy caricature of religion rather than with the real thing.
At the same time, I would prioritise the agreement on avoiding cruelty (even if there was no underlying agreement about why we prioritise it) above shared ultimate ends. To some extent, this is a minimalist, interim position: if we can't even agree not to be cruel to one another, what hope is there of agreement on shared ends? If we can, maybe that is how we start to build the trust required to agree about ends?
Personally, I would agree that grounding the injunction in what Taylor calls 'exclusive humanism' is utterly unsatisfying, even if Shklar herself does. That said, I'd be very happy if the dominant branch of secular liberal humanism took Shklar's route while still disagreeing with me about the metaphysics. It would become, perhaps, actually humane and tolerant that way.
I also find her definition of cruelty too narrow, although I think it is intended in a indicative rather than legalistic manner: I discuss this here, although it is (oddly enough) mixed up with quite a lot of talk about the history of British cheeses: https://flatcapsandfatalism.substack.com/p/lost-cheeses-and-impersonal-cruelty?s=w
I'm really happy to hear you will be introducing her to your civics students: surely a better use of their time than Fukuyama et al!
I put a few sections of "The End of History" on the reading list just to illustrate to them how wrong much of what we think about today's world might be.
BTW: Maybe I should be worried that a guy named Fatalist seems to be more optimistic about society than I am. :-) Great conversation. Thanks.
Likewise!