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The doctrines of Hobbes and Locke are better characterized as theories of natural right rather than natural law: Rights are prior to duties and obligations, which ultimately are viewed as utilitarian or instrumental. There must be "extra-liberal shared norms and standards" because, at least for the many, rational self-interest is not s…
The doctrines of Hobbes and Locke are better characterized as theories of natural right rather than natural law: Rights are prior to duties and obligations, which ultimately are viewed as utilitarian or instrumental. There must be "extra-liberal shared norms and standards" because, at least for the many, rational self-interest is not sufficient, but there is no "metaphysical grounding" for such standards. They are simply political necessities. Or one could say that they are grounded in the fear of political chaos.
It appears the "fear of political chaos" is insufficient grounding for the modern mind. I still think the best explanation of that is still the 300 year rundown of shared cultural standards that predate Enlightenment liberalism. However, I hope I am wrong.
I think you are correct, we abandon our cultural heritage - Judeo Christian - out of arrogance, end of history thinking: these things do not apply to our age. Lyons questions if the early success of liberalism is attributed to it riding on the coattails of the earlier religious ethos which it destroyed.
Leonard Liggio's exploration of the historical roots of classical liberalism/liberty might be useful.*
Classical liberalism in decentralized political culture (before 1492) grew out of the co-emergence of "W.E.I.R.D." (Henrich) social characteristics, which involved the early Church's ban on cousin marriage to destroy the power of (inbred) clans.
As the gene pool in NW Europe became more outbred and more variable, the need for increased literacy and numeracy as the urban commoner classes expanded along with river and sea trade (and the market economy) selected for higher IQ and "liberal personality".
"Liberal personality" was also selected for because high-social-trust was required in new "liberal" (post-feudal) social institutions.
Liggio cites the case of the Cluniac Abbies (France, Camino de Santiago) promoting peasants' rights, and the Peace and Truce of God movement.
Liggio sees a regression to oriental despotism (imperialism, political recentralization) after 1492, as the "modern" political elites swept aside decentralized politics and "classically liberal" medieval institutions (cortes, fueros, communas), replacing them with Absolutism (especially in Spain).
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* https://phillysoc.org/liggio-the-hispanic-tradition-of-liberty/
excerpt:
The conquest of the kingdom of Grenada in 1492 witnessed the establishment of Absolutism, the core feature of which was the end of the universal, supra-political position of religion and especially of the Church. The universal church was replaced under Absolutism by a subservient, state religious bureau. Throughout Europe in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the
[->] universal, trans-political position of the Church was ended.
For example, the French kings and rulers of the Spanish kingdoms were able by Concordats to gain from the Papacy total control over the church institutions in their territories.
The Protestant reformation, the second phase of this movement, occurred where local rulers were not able to gain similar concessions from the Popes; countries where rulers had wrested control of the Church remained "faithful" and sought to consolidate their gains through the Catholic Reformation centered on the Council of Trent. In Spain, the rulers of Castile, Aragon, and Cataluna after 1480 gained the power to establish political inquisitions beyond the powers of the bishops.
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Just as the Monarchist’s Church of the Council of Trent (with the Royal Inquisition) contributed to Absolutism, the history of Spain and Spanish colonies in the reign of Charles V indicate
[->] the great turning point whereby Spain lost its medieval constitutionalism
and led much of Europe in substitution of oriental despotism. As William Graham Sumner’s The Conquest of the United States by Spain (1900) showed that while the U.S. conquered Spain’s colonies, Spain’s imperialist ideas had conquered the intellect of American politicians, so the distinguishing characteristics of European constitutionalism compared to oriental despotism (cf. Jones, The European Miracle (1981) were lost with Spanish conquests of Asia and South America. Spain adopted the imperial methods of India, Turkey, China, Mexico, and Peru in place of decentralized, limited constitutional institutions of medieval Europe.
The decline and political control of religious institutions in the fifteenth century undermined the foundations of European constitutionalism’s uniqueness. The Spanish crown’s access to the gold and silver of the Aztec and Inca despotisms made Spain the paymaster of European wars for a Century and a half. Castilian infantry excelled throughout Europe leaving Spain’s monetary and human wealth in graves around Europe. To achieve imperial greatness, Spain had to
[->] abandon the medieval free market and constitutional institutions.
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