Strangely, the article left me in mostly in agreement with the solutions, though the analysis is poor. There are many assertions made about the fence as a system—this is nonlinear, emergent behavior, etc.—without citing any real sources about how it worked. The use of failure cascade here does not match my understanding either. A failure…
Strangely, the article left me in mostly in agreement with the solutions, though the analysis is poor. There are many assertions made about the fence as a system—this is nonlinear, emergent behavior, etc.—without citing any real sources about how it worked. The use of failure cascade here does not match my understanding either. A failure cascade is the proverbial house of cards collapsing as a result of a single point of failure. What Hamas executed was a systematic dismantling of a complex system, predicated on digital communication and surveillance. Anyone that's had to work a radio in wartime will tell you both how important communications are and how unreliable they are. The worst part was the example of EVs as being a less complex system. In fact, EVs are far more simple devices (see how much unions worry they'll lose jobs from having fewer parts to install). They do not have the benefit of a hundred years of refinement and innovation that internal combustion engines enjoy in both their design and production. So then, which is preferable? Simplicity or mature, proven technological systems?
Where this analysis succeeds is rooting the solutions in people. Boyd's principles are excellent and a great inclusion that illuminate the strategy for successfully deploying technology. I am curious if the IDF ever attempted a penetration test of their own fence, and if they came up with Hamas/Iran's plan. If not, why not? Similarly, they could have employed the "chaos monkey" approach, where you simply remove a component of your system and see how resilient it is in the face of one or multiple failures. Simply removing wireless communications would have highlighted how fragile this system was. Frankly, I would not be surprised to learn there was no stress-testing of such a system usually because they're politically unviable. If you invested political capital in making the fence, you're unlikely to want evidence from experts it doesn't work. The root failure mode, though, is a leadership failure and maybe a lack of imagination, neither of which can be solved with technology. My goal here is not to argue the fence is a good idea (evidence shows it's pretty terrible), but simply how future systems (including men with guns on a wall) should be evaluated and tested to gauge their merit.
Strangely, the article left me in mostly in agreement with the solutions, though the analysis is poor. There are many assertions made about the fence as a system—this is nonlinear, emergent behavior, etc.—without citing any real sources about how it worked. The use of failure cascade here does not match my understanding either. A failure cascade is the proverbial house of cards collapsing as a result of a single point of failure. What Hamas executed was a systematic dismantling of a complex system, predicated on digital communication and surveillance. Anyone that's had to work a radio in wartime will tell you both how important communications are and how unreliable they are. The worst part was the example of EVs as being a less complex system. In fact, EVs are far more simple devices (see how much unions worry they'll lose jobs from having fewer parts to install). They do not have the benefit of a hundred years of refinement and innovation that internal combustion engines enjoy in both their design and production. So then, which is preferable? Simplicity or mature, proven technological systems?
Where this analysis succeeds is rooting the solutions in people. Boyd's principles are excellent and a great inclusion that illuminate the strategy for successfully deploying technology. I am curious if the IDF ever attempted a penetration test of their own fence, and if they came up with Hamas/Iran's plan. If not, why not? Similarly, they could have employed the "chaos monkey" approach, where you simply remove a component of your system and see how resilient it is in the face of one or multiple failures. Simply removing wireless communications would have highlighted how fragile this system was. Frankly, I would not be surprised to learn there was no stress-testing of such a system usually because they're politically unviable. If you invested political capital in making the fence, you're unlikely to want evidence from experts it doesn't work. The root failure mode, though, is a leadership failure and maybe a lack of imagination, neither of which can be solved with technology. My goal here is not to argue the fence is a good idea (evidence shows it's pretty terrible), but simply how future systems (including men with guns on a wall) should be evaluated and tested to gauge their merit.